Dries van Agt (CDA), prime minister 1977-1982, representative of the European Union in Japan (1987-1989) and the United States (1989-1995).
Ruud Lubbers (CDA), prime minister 1982-1994, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2001-2005.
See also the Dutch political parties overview tables where the exact election results, as well as the alignment of the parties on several issues, are detailed.
One inflexible rule of Dutch politics is that exactly two of the three large parties form the government coalition, sometimes aided by a smaller party. The third large party remains in the opposition. This page gives some information on the three large parties and their Ins and Outs.
The three large parties are:
Note to American readers: In European politics, Liberal means moderate right wing, and not extreme left wing.
PvdA is Left, CDA is Centre, VVD is Right. This simple scheme of things works fine as long as we don't consider the small parties—who show an unfortunate tendency to become large parties and complicate Dutch politics considerably. Let's keep it simple for the moment, though, ignore the fact that the SP passed the VVD last elections, and stick to the traditional Big Three.
Take a look at the data table below. It specifies Dutch governments from 1977 until present, and shows which parties were In and which were Out. Note especially the 1994 elections: they form a break with the past in several respects.
The leader of the largest party in government becomes prime minister. Van Agt, Lubbers, and Balkenende are CDA, Kok is PvdA.
Government is always named after its prime minister, and when necessary a Roman numeral is added to denote whether it's this prime minister's first, second, etc. government.
When a party leaves government (PvdA in 1982; D66 in 2006), the prime minister forms a new, temporary minority caretaker government that consists of the remaining parties and that handles current affairs and the organisation of new elections. Van Agt III and Balkenende III are caretaker governments.
D66*: D66 in government, even though it was not needed for obtaining a majority in parliament. See Sacred Rules on the previous page for an explanation.
| Year | Combined seats (out of 150) | Government | PvdA | CDA | VVD | Other parties |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1977 | 130 | Van Agt I | OUT | IN | IN | none |
| 1978 | ||||||
| 1979 | ||||||
| 1980 | ||||||
| 1981 | 120 | Van Agt II and III | IN | IN | OUT | D66* |
| 1982 | 128 | Lubbers I | OUT | IN | IN | none |
| 1983 | ||||||
| 1984 | ||||||
| 1985 | ||||||
| 1986 | 133 | Lubbers II | OUT | IN | IN | none |
| 1987 | ||||||
| 1988 | ||||||
| 1989 | 125 | Lubbers III | IN | IN | OUT | none |
| 1990 | ||||||
| 1991 | ||||||
| 1992 | ||||||
| 1993 | ||||||
| Year | Combined seats (out of 150) | Government | PvdA | CDA | VVD | Other parties |
| 1994 | 102 | Kok I (Purple I) |
IN | OUT | IN | D66 |
| 1995 | ||||||
| 1996 | ||||||
| 1997 | ||||||
| 1998 | 112 | Kok II (Purple II) |
IN | OUT | IN | D66* |
| 1999 | ||||||
| 2000 | ||||||
| 2001 | ||||||
| 2002 | 90 | Balkenende I | OUT | IN | IN | LPF |
| 2003 | 114 | Balkenende II and III | OUT | IN | IN | D66 |
| 2004 | ||||||
| 2005 | ||||||
| 2006 | 96 | Balkenende IV | IN | IN | OUT | CU |
| Year | Combined seats (out of 150) | Government | PvdA | CDA | VVD | Other parties |
One pattern is immediately obvious: any government includes only two of the three large parties. The third one is always Out. This is one of the Sacred Laws of Dutch politics.
Dries van Agt (CDA), prime minister 1977-1982, representative of the European Union in Japan (1987-1989) and the United States (1989-1995).
Ruud Lubbers (CDA), prime minister 1982-1994, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2001-2005.
In practice, this law used to mean that the CDA could select either PvdA or VVD to govern with. CDA + PvdA or CDA + VVD usually obtain a majority, and the CDA's flexibility in economical matters allows it to easily adapt to whichever coalition partner it currently has.
The CDA was formed in 1977 from one Catholic and two Protestant parties. If we'd continue this table back to 1918, we'd see that every single Dutch government contained at least one, and usually two or all three, of these parties. Basically the CDA has been In since 1918. It feels itself to be the natural government party.
As you can see in the table, party leaders and prime ministers Van Agt and Lubbers switched from left to right as the occasion warranted. In 1977 Van Agt ruled with the VVD, despite the PvdA being the largest. In 1981 he switched to the Left because CDA + VVD lost their majority. In 1982, again despite the PvdA being the largest party, Lubbers switched back to the right, and in the 1986 elections he sucked 9 seats from his coalition partner, after which the coalition was continued, though with more power for the CDA.
In the 1989 elections the CDA remained stable, while both PvdA and VVD lost. Since CDA + VVD now only commanded the slimmest possible majority of 76 seats, Lubbers again switched to the left. PvdA party leader Wim Kok became finance minister.
Thus, the CDA was the joyful bride of Dutch politics, wooed by left and right alike.
Until 1994. It is impossible to overrate the importance of the 1994 elections which resulted in the Purple government. The CDA went Out for the first time since 1918, the Big Three started to slide down, and Dutch politics were revolutionized.
In 1994 the CDA lost heavily (54 to 34 seats). This was mainly due to the arrogance of power, and also to Lubbers' decision to step down as party leader. His successor, Brinkman, lacked many social graces and kind of assumed the CDA would become the largest party no matter what he did. He made some vague but potentially threatening noises about old age pensions, and senior citizens reacted by founding separate parties that sucked 7 seats from the CDA.
We'll get back to D66 and its curious role in Dutch politics later.
More in general, people voted against the government. PvdA also lost (49 to 37 seats), but less heavily than the CDA. Besides, times were more in favour of the PvdA than the CDA. The great victor of the elections, centrist D66 (12 to 24 seats), proposed to form a government without the CDA, a revolution in Dutch politics. PvdA and VVD agreed, and the Kok I government was formed, nicknamed Purple for being a blend of Red (PvdA) and Blue (VVD). For the first time in 76 years, the CDA was Out.
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, CDA party leader 1997-2001, minister of foreign affairs 2002-3, secretary general of the NATO 2004-present, demonstrates the victimized sheep look.
So used had the CDA grown to being In, that its main reaction to this revolution was a profound disbelief. It cultivated a vicitimized sheep look (later perfected by Balkenende) and a "but we're supposed to be in power, no really!" attitude, but left actual opposition to the smaller parties, who had plenty of experience in this role.
(What the others didn't realize back then is that vicitimzed sheep fit perfectly into the Christian ethos. From a Christian perspective, weakness is strength, after all, and later on Balkenende profited from this.)
In 1998 the Purple success was repeated. D66 lost, but PvdA and VVD won, and in total Purple II had 5 more seats than Purple I.
Besides the CDA being ousted, a second trend surfaced in 1994: the combined large parties lost seats; permanently, as far as we can see. Where in the 1977-1993 CDA heydays the three large parties on average had 128 seats combined, after 1994 they dropped to 106 seats combined. Besides, the ups and downs became much steeper. Dutch voters are increasingly looking beyond the Big Three to fringe parties (which, as a result, lose much of their fringiness).
In addition, during the CDA dominance any combination of two of the Big Three usually commanded a parliamentary majority and could form a stable government. However, since 1994 this cannot be taken for granted any more. After the radical 1994, 2002 and 2006 elections, the two largest of the Big Three combined held 71, 67 and 74 seats, respectively.
Wim Kok (PvdA), finance minister 1989-1994, prime minister 1994-2002.
In many ways the Purple parties were a perfect match. All three were ethically liberal, cosmopolitan in outlook, and tired of the CDA's centre position in politics. Most of the progressive measures the Netherlands have become famous (or infamous) for, such as euthanasia and gay marriage, were enacted during Purple, when ethically conservative CDA was Out.
There was one point, though, on which the parties didn't match too well: economics. The Purple government consisted of one Left party (PvdA), one Centre party (D66), and one Right party (VVD). A compromise on economics had to be found.
The compromise was that the PvdA enthousiastically embraced the VVD's free market fundamentalism, even though it occasionally murmured appropriate noises about protecting the weaker members of society. This shift in the PvdA had first become apparent during the Lubbers III government, when party leader and later prime minister Wim Kok became finance minister in order to prove that the taxpayer's money was safe even with a Socialist. After that experience, switching all the way to centre-right economics (or at least, not opposing them much) was not such a huge step. In this respect, Kok was an example for Tony Blair and other European centre-left leaders.
Nonetheless, the PvdA's switch didn't sit well with its traditional electorate. Besides, another problem surfaced during Purple: immigration.
We'll get back to the immigration issue and the political upheavals it caused later.
Economically, the immigration issue is simple. The vast majority of recent immigrants, and even their children, has had little schooling, and thus competes for the same jobs as the native Dutch lower class, a large part of which traditionally votes PvdA. Combined with the centre-right government policy, this meant the traditional PvdA electorate started doubting its party.
One wonders if the same is going to happen to British New Labour and German SPD.
Even more curious is that the voters haven't forgotten. During the 2006 electoral campaign, PvdA's economical stance during the Purple period was an issue; not the most important one, but not forgotten either. In my opinion, current party leader Bos is too much of a Purple boy to ever regain the confidence of the traditional PvdA voters.
We'll get back to Pim Fortuyn and the LPF later.
In the 2002 elections, all these matters came to a head. In a curious mirroring of the 1994 situation, prime minister Kok decided to step down, and his successor as PvdA party leader, Melkert, lacked all social graces and made some serious miscalculations during the campaigning, the most important of which was not taking Pim Fortuyn seriously. As a result the PvdA lost 22 of its 45 seats, all of which were picked up by right-wing LPF.
Jan Peter Balkenende (CDA), prime minister 2002-present.
In addition, the CDA came back to the centre of power (29 to 43 seats). Apparently the voters had lost confidence in government, and those that wanted moderation flocked back to the victimized sheep who'd been so sorely abused by the Purple parties.
Despite all disturbances, the dance of Ins and Outs went on much as before. The PvdA was now the longest-sitting government party (1989-2002), so its turn to be Out had come. Since it was also the biggest loser of the elections, this was natural.
Unfortunately CDA + VVD did not command a majority either, and CDA leader Balkenende was forced to invite newcomer LPF into government. This government proved to be painful and short-lived, and new elections were held.
The ensuing 2003 elections appeared to spell a return to normalcy. The PvdA grew dramatically (23 to 42 seats) and the LPF declined dramatically (26 to 8 seats).
Despite this outcome, the voters' revolution was far from over. The PvdA's fundamental problems had not been solved yet. Even though many defectors to the LPF returned to the fold in 2003, they could just as easily desert again, as they in fact did in the 2006 elections.
After protracted negotiations the PvdA declined to form a coalition with the CDA, while the CDA + VVD combination still did not command a majority. Balkenende was forced to select a third party, and eventually found it in D66. This proved not totally satisfactory, since in 2006 D66 quit government and new elections were necessary.
The pattern is clear: the CDA has returned to power, but it still has to form a stable government that remains in power for the full four years. Short-lived and painful governments have become something of a trade mark of prime minister Balkenende, and the 2006 elections don't make it easier for him, either.
The outcome of the 2006 elections is rather confusing. For the first time in history, all three Big Parties lost seats. Despite all these changes, the In and Out dance appears to continue unimpeded. In 2006 the VVD was the longest-sitting government party (1994-2006), so its time for a bit of Outage has clearly come. CDA and PvdA are forced to form a government, together with a third party to make up for the two missing seats, even though neither of them is enthousiastic about it (neither are the voters, BTW).
The real question when it comes to the Big Three is: will the CDA go Out after the next elections? It should in order to keep the In/Out system that has existed since 1994 stable, but there's always the chance that the CDA will return to its ancient dominance of Dutch politics.
Besides, all of the Big Three face dangers in the political landscape. The dangers for PvdA and VVD were clearly visible in the 2006 elections; while the dangers for the CDA haven't yet come to a head.
Wouter Bos, PvdA party leader 2002-present.
As I said earlier, the PvdA's biggest problem is its wavering economics. During the Purple period it was centre-right rather than left, and as a result a significant portion of its traditional electorate is groping for new ways of getting leftist economics. Back in 2002 this issue was confused with the immigration issue, which lead to the LPF's huge success.
Although most voters returned in 2003, PvdA leader Bos remains far too much a Purple boy to convince them permanently of his Left economics. (Bos was secretary for Finance in Purple II.) Therefore, in 2006 many voters opted for strict leftist SP (Socialist Party).
We'll get back to the SP later.
As the SP did not fail to note during the campaign, a vote for the SP is also a vote that forces the PvdA to the left. If the PvdA persists in its centre economics, it will lose even more seats to the SP.
That's Bos' dilemma right now: participating in a CDA + PvdA + ? government without the SP will force him back to the economical centre, and the SP will profit from that stand in the next elections. Therefore Bos vastly prefers a CDA + PvdA + SP government, in which the SP will also have to tarnish its principles. This, in turn, is not very attractive to the CDA, who doesn't want to be outvoted by a considerable margin by the Left parties.
Mark Rutte, VVD party leader 2006-present.
Rita Verdonk, minister of immigration and integration 2002-present; unsuccesful right-wing candidate for the VVD party leadership 2006.
The VVD's basic problem is one of direction: turn left (towards the middle) or right? Much depends on that choice. In the internal party leadership elections of 2006 centrist Mark Rutte narrowly defeated right-winger Rita Verdonk, currently minister of immigration and integration, and very outspoken on those issues.
Nonetheless, the absymal performance of the VVD in the 2006 elections (28 to 22 seats) might reopen the leadership question. It is said (and I agree) that under Verdonk, the VVD would have been more popular under right-wingers who now voted for the extreme right. For them, Rutte was too much of a Purple boy, exactly the same problem Bos has; even though Rutte was not a member of the Purple governments.
Rutte and Verdonk represent a very real split within the VVD, and the struggle between these two streams hasn't yet ended. After the elections, Rutte felt forced to declare he'd stay on as party leader time and again, a sure sign of uncertainty.
In any case, the extreme right is a serious threat to the VVD. In that respect, the VVD being Out for the next government is a good thing: it doesn't have to sully its principles by compromises, and it might pull its act together and gain back the confidence of the right-wing voters.
We'll get back to the CU later.
At the moment the CDA hasn't yet encountered problems similar to the PvdA and VVD, but a possible candidate has appeared: the CU (ChristenUnie; Union of Christians). This party can touch the soft underbelly of the CDA that no other party can reach: the Christian voters who don't like voting for a secular, ethically liberal party but who're not wholly convinced of the CDA's present course, either.
I'm not sure how large this group is, and whether the CU stands a chance. It is decidedly left wing in its economics, often voting with the Socialist parties on welfare and other social issues. Whether the average Christian CDA voter likes this stance remains to be seen.
The CU is the sole candidate for causing the CDA trouble on the Christian side. The third Christian party, orthodox Calvinist SGP, is too extreme even for other Calvinists with its stand on women's subservience to men and other strict ethics.
Not all CDA voters are led primarily by Christian values; some (most?) look for a safe, solid middle party. These voters might switch to a secular party, but right now they don't seem to be doing that a lot. That's why Balkenende will likely continue as prime minister.